© Shutterstock.com

Leveraging
African
Culture
For Development

Aspects of African culture have been – and can further be – leveraged to foster more inclusive development on the African continent. A number of research surveys have shown that culture, defined as 'prior beliefs, and values or preferences' (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006), can change development outcomes.

By William Gumede

Aspects of African culture have been – and can further be – leveraged to foster more inclusive development on the African continent. A number of research surveys have shown that culture, defined as 'prior beliefs, and values or preferences' (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006), can change development outcomes. Economically, culture is seen as 'those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation' (Guiso et al., 2006), while anthropologists often define culture as collective 'habits that are shared by members of a society' (Murdock, 1965). In all of these definitions, it is apparent that culture is learned. Culture is also dynamic and changes quickly with time. Africa's brush with colonialism, industrialization and, more recently technology, have and will further change African culture.

But African culture is not inimical to development. The South Korean development economist Ha-Joon Chang (2007) rightly argues that developing a country's cultures to be leveraged successfully for development, depends on how people interpret their culture. 'Which aspects they choose to highlight, and which interpretation wins in political and ideological battles' will ultimately determine whether an African country develops successfully.

Post-colonial 'developmental' uses of aspects of African cultures often undermined development

In the past, many attempts at leveraging cultural aspects for development in Africa have failed. For instance, in 1967 in Tanzania, Julius Nyerere issued his Arusha Declaration, which called for 'villagisation' of the rural areas as the anchor development strategy of the newly independent government. The concept was both based on African socialism, a variant proposed and conceptualised by Nyerere which combined African communalism with socialism, dubbed *ujamaa*, and the African traditional concept of extended family, with villagisation being seen as an extended family practiced over a large scale (Coldham, 1995). The idea was to get rural Tanzanians to live communally in villages. Production would be collectivised and cultivation communal. Those who opposed villagisation were jailed.

> ❝In the past, many attempts at leveraging cultural aspects for development in Africa have failed. For instance, in 1967 in Tanzania, Julius Nyerere issued his Arusha Declaration, which called for 'villagisation' of the rural areas as the anchor development strategy of the newly independent government. ❞

In many cases, villigisation meant resettling people from vast areas into central villages. The idea was to promote collective farming and establish a modern agricultural industry, as well as to make it easier for the newly independent government to deliver public services to communities that were traditionally scattered across the countryside. Nyerere also believed that it would reduce poverty, and social and economic inequalities, between traditional leaders who controlled communal lands through customary law, and ordinary citizens, private landowners and farmworkers. In 1971, TANU issued guidelines called Mwongozo, which called for the establishment of a 'people's militia', which would enforce implementation of TANU policy in the villages.

The plan failed. Experts argued it lacked technical capacity and that the communities were not adequately consulted, and as a result were not often enthusiastic about the plan. With agricultural activities already having been disrupted by the villagisation programme, Tanzania also experienced low rainfalls in 1973 and 1975. Food production plummeted and food had to be imported. This coincided with the oil price crisis of the early 1970s and rising fuel prices.

In 1976, the government issued a directive, in which it admitted mistakes in the implementation of the villagisation programme. The country plunged into an economic crisis in the 1980s and was forced to seek support from the World Bank, IMF and international donors. In return for this support, the organisations demanded that Tanzania implement structural adjustment policies, which meant reducing the role of the state, cutting state subsidise to the poor and liberalising markets to allow foreign competitors.

Another example of failure to successfully leverage culture in Africa was Kenneth Kaunda's introduction of 'humanism' in Zambia, immediately

after the end of colonialism. Kaunda argued that 'the traditional African village is the model of social organization that modern Zambia should adopt in its socioeconomic development' (in Idoye, 1988). The United National Independence Party (UNIP) adopted the strategy at its April 1967 national council. A core part of the strategy was to cluster villages for agricultural production.

African cultural values were blended with socialism and Christian practices. The political system was envisioned to be a 'one-party participatory democracy'. Kaunda encouraged communities to organise themselves into cooperatives, engage in mutual aid and practice communalism. Villages across the country were regrouped into new communities. Zambia was to return to an ideal African communal economy, with trade and relations based on pre-colonial days. Private industries were nationalised and capitalism was rejected as exploitation of humans. Humanism

> 66 Continuing patriarchy in Africa, practised under the rubric of 'culture', curtails the full participation of women, youth and those deemed of lower social status in the life of society, which in turn undermines development. 99

was thus seen as a philosophy that would be the binding agent, weaving different ethnic groups into one common national identity. The state was to be modelled along ancient African communal structures.

However, there was widespread confusion over what a pre-colonial village communal cooperative should now look like post-independence. Moreover, over time, the government would fund only the cooperatives in its strongholds. Most Zambians thus remained as subsistence farmers, just as they were at independence. By the 1970s, humanism had failed, with the economy in tailspin. The Kaunda government could not turn the communal style economy into practical development policies.

The final example we will look at here is that of Swaziland. The country, unlike Tanzania and Zambia, has an absolute monarchy, with the king as the head of state. The political system called 'Thinkundla', is a non-party state, with an advisory council of handpicked individuals who, together with traditional leaders, serve as 'advisors' (Kingdom of eSwati, 2005). All parties have been banned since 1973.

In 2018, the absolute monarch, Mswati III, unilaterally changed the name of the country to eSwatini, meaning 'place of the Swazi' (News24, 2018). From 1978 until 1993, non-party elections took place for a House of Assembly. There was no registration of voters and the ballots were not secret. The people voted by passing through a gate assigned for the candidate of their choice. The king handpicked an Electoral Committee to oversee the elections.

In 2005, the country adopted a constitution that gave legislative power to Mswati III. The king could veto or overturn all legislation adopted by 'parliament' (Motsamai, 2012). In this constitution, the registering of voters was re-introduced and a secret ballot was established. The new voting procedure entails the following: elections take place in two parts (Kingdom of eSwatini, 2005).The first part occurs within the chiefdoms or *inkhundla*, into which the country is divided, which serve as electoral constituencies. From here, candidates for election are selected. Campaigning is banned. Once the *inkundla* candidates are elected, voters then vote for one candidate who will go to the House of Assembly. Nominee candidates are permitted to campaign at this point. In the everyday running of the kingdom, traditional leaders 'govern' their chiefdoms and are directly accountable to the king (Kingdom of eSwatini, 2005).

Human rights, however, remain an issue. Insult laws prohibits criticism of the monarchy and freedom of expression and association is restricted. It has also been cited as among the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2018). Married women have the status of 'legal minors', subject to 'marital power' of their husbands and cannot in their own right enter into legal contracts (Kingdom of eSwatini, 1964). Marital rape is legal. Moreover, forced marriage and child marriage are common. There no laws to make domestic violence a crime (Amnesty International, 2010). Over 63% of the population live under the World Bank's US$2 dollar a day poverty line (World Bank, 2016). The International Monetary Fund

(2012) states that were it not for Sudan, Swaziland would have the worse economic performance in the world.

Some African cultural practices undermine individual human rights, dignity and freedom

Continuing patriarchy in Africa, practised under the rubric of 'culture', curtails the full participation of women, youth and those deemed of lower social status in the life of society, which in turn undermines development. The United Nations estimated that gender inequality costs African countries at least US\$95b a year in lost economic potential (Clark, 2016). In contrast, research shows that economic growth is higher, poverty lessened and countries more peaceful when there are high levels of gender equality (African Development Bank, 2015). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 's (OECD) research shows that ending child marriage in Niger would save that country more than USD 25bn by 2030 (Ferrant and Hamel, 2018). If gender equality in the labour market is only moderately improved, GDP would increase 1% in Ghana and Liberia and 31% in Nigeria (Ferrant and Hamel, 2018).

Yet, even if formal constitutions and laws provide for gender equality, customary law and cultural practices often do the opposite. In many African countries, cultural practices governing gender relations, marriage and property ownership are exempted from non-discrimination clauses in constitutions and formal laws. As such, 'many African women still live under traditional belief systems and outdated legislation that treats them as less than full citizens and prevents their voice from being fully heard in the governance of African societies' (African Development Bank, 2015).

For instance, in many African countries, women also cannot own or inherit land. Where traditional institutions are in place, women often cannot become kings, traditional leaders or chiefs, or take over traditional office from their husbands or male relations if they die or become incapacitated. In Zimbabwe, because of archaic patriarchal beliefs, widows often lose their marital homes and lands when their husbands pass away (Human Rights Watch, 2018). African women are also often prevented from getting or completing education (Ferrant and Hamel, 2018). In some African countries, a married woman cannot apply for a passport without her husband's approval. It is also often compulsory for women to obey their husbands in these contexts (Action for Southern Africa, 2016).

In Libya, many cultural practices has been consistently criticised for undermining fundamental human rights and the freedoms of dignity accorded to individuals. One cultural practice, female genital mutilation (FGM), has been particularly highlighted by local and international civil society and human rights organisations for undermining women's rights. A report by the Human Rights and Protection Section (HRPS) of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) found that 'culture' in Liberia 'too often becomes

In Libya, one cultural practice, female genital mutilation (FGM), has been particularly highlighted by local and international civil society and human rights organisations for undermining women's rights.

a space in which serious crimes are committed, and that criminal offenses perpetrated through harmful traditional practices often go unpunished due to their perceived cultural dimensions' (HRPS, 2015). The mission also observed that 'in many cases, traditional or customary actors assume the powers and functions of the formal justice system'.

Liberia has cultural societies that oversee the practice of culture. They are divided into *Poro* (for men) and the *Sande* (for women). Liberia's National Council of Chiefs and Elders are representative organisations for traditional and cultural authorities.

These cultural societies are presided over

nationally by a *Poro zoe* (Chief) and *Sande zoe* (Chief). The National Council of Chiefs and Elders are headed by the *Poro zoe*. The government consults the council on traditional and cultural issues, as well as conflict resolution. Chiefs are paid by the government. These societies have a wide influence, especially in the northern, central and western regions of Liberia. The *Sande* society specifically requires female adherents to under FGM. The UN has warned Liberia that cultural practices such as FGM are incompatible with the international human rights treaties the country had signed (HRPS, 2015). Yet many African political, cultural and traditional leaders, including some in Liberia, 'have a vested interest in promoting continuing beliefs that provide them with rents' (Lopez-Claros and Perotti, 2014).

African colonial and post-colonial governments manipulate culture to subject peoples

During colonialism and apartheid, colonial powers often chose to highlight aspects or distorted elements of African culture and traditions that would reinforce the oppression of the colonised African people. Such aspects were often autocratic, subservient or anti-developmental. Governments thus used these elements to govern African populations through a different set of laws, called 'customary law', which were ostensibly African 'traditional' and 'cultural' laws, conventions and institutions. The African scholar Mahmood Mamdani (1996) called this phenomenon the 'indirect rule' of colonial governments. Colonial governments worked with 'traditional leaders', chiefs and kings or installed their own, and set new, 'traditional' rules, laws and institutions to make people subservient to both the colonial government and the colonial government-endorsed 'traditional' leaders, chiefs, kings and institutions.

In the post-independence period, most African governments and leaders retained the colonially appointed traditional chiefs, kings and structures – and their powers over their 'subjects' – on condition that these former colonial appendages ensured their 'subjects'' loyally support or vote for the African governments and leaders. In the post-independence period, many African leaders and governments have highlighted or emphasized only the more autocratic, subservient and anti-

developmental aspects of African culture and tradition. They have done so in many cases to reinforce their own control over their populations.

Moreover, some African countries and leaders have either, for self-interested reasons, emphasised the undemocratic elements of African culture or, for ideological reasons, rejected democracy building as 'foreign' (Gumede, 2012). For instance, some have opportunistically argued that democracy is unAfrican, 'Western' or against African culture because it shields them from democratic scrutiny in order to continue to enrich themselves at the expense of overwhelmingly poor Africans (Gumede, 2012). For example, South African President Jacob Zuma claimed that corruption is a 'Western paradigm' (in du Plessis and du Plessis, 2014). He went on to claim that he needed to be judged by African 'culture' while building an R246m private home with taxpayers' money while his supporters lived and died in grinding poverty (Gumede, 2012). It is ostensibly fine in Zuma's African 'culture' for the leader to live an enriched life on the sweat of his 'subjects', while his 'subjects' live in dire poverty, homelessness and unemployment (Gumede, 2012).

Some African governments and leaders have thus invented new African 'traditions' and 'cultures', claiming these to be authentic (Gumede, 2012). Such new African 'traditions' and 'cultures' have been invented by self-serving leaders and governments to either shore up their own power, shield themselves from criticisms or to build their political support base – and so their ability to secure patronage – among the poor, uneducated and uninformed communities (Gumede, 2012).

A case in point in South Africa is the recent re-invention of virginity testing as ostensibly an isiZulu cultural 'tradition' (Gumede, 2012). Virginity testing, called *ukuhlolwa kwezintombi*, at some stage was periodically practiced as a rite of passage to womanhood by some isiZulu communities before it fell entirely into disuse. However, it was reintroduced by King Goodwill Zwelithini in 1984 to increase his popularity during a period that saw a number of youth rebellions against apartheid and violent divisions between United Democratic Front/ANC activists and Inkatha Freedom Party supporters in KwaZulu Natal.

The practice of virginity testing has been rightly opposed by civil society organisations such as

the People Opposing Women Abuse (BBC, 2016). It has also been rejected by the Commission for Gender Equality as 'fundamentally discriminatory' (Gender and Equality Commission, 2016), as 'It goes against the ethos of the constitutional provisions in relation to dignity, equality and discrimination' (Gender and Equality Commission, 2016).

How aspects of African culture boost development

Botswana, since its independence, has emphasised aspects of African traditional culture that has aided development. For instance, the country has promoted the practice of *lekgotla*, which involves popular participation in decision-making, consensus-seeking, governing in the interest of the majority of the population and leadership accountability. A *lekgotla* is a community or village meeting to determine local policy where decisions are made by consensus. Everyone is equal and has the right to speak and no one is interrupted. This tradition has been adopted at various government levels to reach

> "Botswana, since its independence, has emphasised aspects of African traditional culture that has aided development. For instance, the country has promoted the practice of *lekgotla*, which involves popular participation in decision-making, consensus-seeking, governing in the interest of the majority of the population and leadership accountability."

policy decisions. Leaders are compelled to consult widely and report back on implementation of decisions. They can be censored for inaction.

Immediately after independence, the country also established the Economic Committee, which reported the Cabinet. The Committee brought together elected leaders and public servants to collaboratively review and amend economic policy. The country also established a National Economic Advisory Council, which included civil society organisations in long-term economic planning.

This collaborative approach to planning and development in Botswana has been described as 'a more open process than is the case in many other African countries, with the ruling party,

interest groups, the private sector and parliament sufficiently involved in plan preparation' (Maipose, 2008). As such, Botswana has comparatively outshone all of those that labelled democracy as unAfrican or introduced aspects of democracy that only favoured them (Carroll and Carroll, 1998). Botswana has been Africa's longest sustained democracy (Maipose, 2008).

At independence in 1966, Botswana was one of the globe's poorest countries. Since then, it has become an economic success, with the last decade averaging growth rates of 5% and more (World Bank, 2019). Over the period 1965/1966 to 2005/2006, its real GDP growth averaged a record 9%. The country now ranks in the upper middle-income group. Poverty has been reduced to 16% (World Bank, 2019). At 9% of its GDP, it has among the highest expenditure on education in the world and provides universal free primary education (World Bank, 2019).

Moreover, although it is mineral-rich, it has escaped the 'resource curse' (Frankel, 2010), whereby developing countries rich in mineral resources, especially in Africa, have tended to have low development, low growth and low democracy coupled with more corruption, authoritarianism and violence. Botswana has been consistently ranked one of the least corrupt countries in Africa (Maipose, 2008).

Rwanda has also attempted to use aspects of culture to aid development. In 2005, eleven years after the 1994 ethnic genocides, the Rwandan government re-established the traditional community court system called *Gacaca* (Kirkby, 2016). In the *Gacaca* system, communities at the local level elected judges to hear the trials of genocide suspects accused of all crimes, except for the planning of genocide. The smallest administrative blocks are cells. Together, these cells form a general assembly, which met weekly and planned community activities. The general assembly also elected *Gacaca* judges *(iriyangamugayo)* from the community (Organisation for African Unity, 2003). The government oversaw the *Gacaca* community courts system through a central National Service for Gacaca Jurisdictions, which formally accepted admittances of guilt or issue warrants of arrest (Organisation for African Unity, 2003).

The courts issued lower sentences if the person was repentant and sought reconciliation with the

> **"The increase in women's leadership is a critical reason for the country's dramatic development and transformation over the past few years (French Development Agency, 2019). Rwanda's average income per capita has quadrupled since 1994, the GDP has multiplied 6 times and the growth rate has been averaging 7% since 1994."**

community (Organisation for African Unity, 2003). Since 2005, more than 12,000 community-based courts tried 1.2 million cases throughout the country. The *Gacaca* trials provided victims with the truth. They gave perpetrators the opportunity to confess their crimes, show remorse and ask for forgiveness in front of their community (Organisation for African Unity, 2003). The idea was that perpetrators had to pay reparations to victims for property violations. Perpetrators did community service, including building roads, homes for survivors and cleaning the environment (Kirkby, 2016). However, this was unevenly implemented, beyond returning victims' assets (Kirkby, 2016). The *Gacaca* courts were closed on 4 May 2012.

Rwanda has also introduced constitutional requirements binding their legislatures to minimum quotas for women. Women now make up 64% of Rwanda's national parliament. This has led to better quality policies, prioritization of gender discriminating laws and greater cultural acceptance of women leaders (Ferrant and

Rwanda's Parliament sitting on 12/08/2018
Courtesy of © http://parliament.gov.rw

Hamel, 2018). The country introduced laws to allow women to own land in their own right and changeg inheritance laws to allow girls to inherit land, property and assets (Hutt, 2016).

The increase in women's leadership is a critical reason for the country's dramatic development and transformation over the past few years (French Development Agency, 2019). Rwanda's average income per capita has quadrupled since 1994, the GDP has multiplied 6 times and the growth rate has been averaging 7% since 1994. Corruption has dropped considerably. Universal primary education is now close to the United Nations Millennium Goals target (French Development Agency, 2019).

Customary law has also been used in Somalia. The country, which has been conflict-ridden since independence from colonialism in 1960, use to operate under a combination of religious law (Sharia), customary law (*Xeer*) and formal constitutional law (Abdile, 2012). However, after President Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, *Xeer* law increasingly became the governance framework in the failed state, under which disputes were settled, crime dealt with and a modicum of social order maintained in areas not controlled by warlords or Al-Shabaab.

The *Xeer* law is divided into 'criminal' (*Xeer Guud*) and 'civil' (*Xeer Gaar*) law (le Sage, 2005). *Xeer* is an oral-based law that dates from before colonialism and the modern spread of Islam. Although it has clan and regional specific nuances, large parts of it are broadly accepted (Leite, 2017). In a dispute, a clan assembly (*shir beeleed*) will be called by the elders (*guurti*) of the disputing parties. Elders will give their judgements on the dispute based on past experiences, precedents or based on what specific *Xeer* 'rules' say (Leite, 2017). However, like many African traditional systems, the law discriminates against women, youth and those of different ethnic groups (Leite, 2017).

In South Africa, the concept of *Ubuntu* (which means behaving in benevolent ways towards others, to care for others and build one's community (Gade, 2012)), was espoused by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (2000). Tutu notes that '[his] humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in what is yours'. Former South African President Nelson Mandela exercised 'Ubuntu-style management', where it places 'emphasis not on differences, but on accommodating these' (Tutu, 2000).

Conclusion

African culture and traditions have both democratic and autocratic aspects, and both developmental and anti-developmental aspects. Moreover, culture is not fixed, and African cultures have been substantially changed by the processes of colonialism, borrowing from other cultures, industrialisation and technology.

It is crucial for Africans to determinedly push the aspects of African culture and traditions that will enhance democracy and development. African cultural practices that undermine individual human dignity, value and rights must be either be abolished immediately or reformed.

Cultural practices that promote discrimination and undermine dignity and freedom must be brought into alignment with democratic constitutions and laws. For instance, 'Discriminatory social norms weaken the implementation and efficiency of gender-sensitive policies, exposing women and girls to ongoing discrimination' (Ferrant and Hamel, 2018). Thus efforts to eradicate FGM in Burkina Faso have so far been unsuccessful because the practice is accepted culturally by a majority of the population, especially men, who argue that is better to marry a circumcised woman (Ferrant and Hamel, 2018).

There has to be greater social acceptance of cultural change. The media, civil society and educational institutions must drive cultural change. The great challenge of this generation in Africa and South Africa is how to emphasise democratic elements in African cultures and traditions, while cutting out autocratic elements to promote development.

If the current generation in African and South Africa fail to rise to this challenge, there will be another generation of failed African states and poverty-stricken, broken and unstable societies. ■

Reference list

Abdile, M. (2012). 'Customary Dispute Resolution in Somalia'. African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, 2(1): 87-110

Action for Southern Africa. (2016). 'Women's Rights in Swaziland'. ActSA, Briefing Paper, June 2016.

African Development Bank. (2015). 'Africa Gender Equality Index'. African Development Bank, Abidjan.

Amnesty International. (2010). 'Too late, too little, the failure of law reform for women in Swaziland'. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AFR55/007/2010/en/

BBC (2016) "South African mayor defends virgin scholarships for students". Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35403501

Carroll, B.W. and Carroll, T. (1998). 'State and Ethnicity in Botswana and Mauritius: Democratic Route to Development?' Journal of Development Studies, 33(4): 471-8.

Chang, H. (2007). Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. Bloomsbury Press.

Clark, H. (2016). 'Presentation of the Director of the UN Development Fund'.

Tokyo International Conference on African Development. Nairobi, August 28.

Coldham, S. (1995). 'Land Tenure Reform in Tanzania: Legal Problems and Perspectives'. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33(2): 227-242.

du Plessis, C. and du Plessis, C. (2014). 'Zuma wanted charges dropped because corruption is a "Western thing"'. City Press. Available from: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Zuma-wanted-charges-dropped-because-corruption-is-a-Western-thing-20141012

Ferrant, G. and Hamel, N. (2018). 'Gender equality in West Africa? The key role of social norms'. OECD Development Matters, OECD Development Centre. Available from: https://oecd-development-matters.org/2018/03/08/gender-equality-in-west-africa-the-key-role-of-social-norms/

Frankel, J.A. (2010). 'The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey'. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15836. Available from: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836

French Development Agency. (2019). 'Reconstruction of Rwanda: "miracle" or mirage?'. AFD, Development News. Available from: https://ideas4development.org/en/reconstruction-rwanda-miracle-mirage/

Gade, C.B.N. (2012). "What is Ubuntu? Different Interpretations among South Africans of African Descent". South African Journal of Philosophy, 31(3): 487.

Gender and Equality Commission (2016). Ruling on 'Bursaries Contingent on Virginity'. Gender and Equality Commission, Johannesburg, June 16.

Guiso, L., Paola Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2006). 'Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?' Journal of Economic Perspectives 20: 23-48.

Gumede, W. (2012). Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times. Tafelberg.

Human Rights Watch. (2018). 'World Report: Zimbabwe – Events of 2017'. Human Rights Watch, January. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/zimbabwe

Human Rights and Protection Section (HRPS). (2015). 'An Assessment of Human Rights Issues Emanating from Traditional Practices in Liberia'. HRPS, of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Freetown.

Hutt, R. (2016). "5 things to know about Rwanda's economy". World Economic Forum. Available from: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/04/5-things-to-know-about-rwanda-s-economy/

Idoye, P. (1988). 'Ideology and the Theater: The Case of Zambia'. Journal of Black Studies, 19(1): 70-78.

International Monetary Fund. (2012). 'Swaziland: Economic Prospects'. IMF, Washington DC.

Kingdom of eSwati. (2005). 'Constitution of the Kingdom of eSwati'. Available from: http://aceproject.org/ regions-en/eisa/SZ/CONSTITUTION%20OF%20THE%20KINGDOM%20OF% 20SWAZILAND%202005.pdf

Kingdom of eSwatini. (1964). 'Marriages Act of 1964'.

Kirkby, C. (2016). 'Rwanda's Gacaca Courts: A Preliminary Critique'. Journal of African Law, 50(2): 94-117.

Le Sage, A. (2005). Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal & Informal Rules of law Initiatives. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

Leite, L. (2017). 'Reinvigoration of Somali Traditional Justice through Inclusive Conflict Resolution Approaches'. African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Accord). Available from: https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/reinvigoration-somali-traditional-justice-inclusive-conflict-resolution-approaches/

Lopez-Claros, A. and Perotti, V. (2014). 'Does Culture Matter for Development?' Policy Brief WPS 7092, World Bank.

Maipose, G.S. (2008). 'Institutional Dynamics of Sustained Rapid Economic Growth with Limited Impact on Poverty Reduction'. Prepared for the UNRISD project on Poverty Reduction and Policy Regimes, UNRISD, January.

Mamdani, M. (1996). Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton University Press.

Motsamai, D. (2012). 'Swaziland's non-party political system and the 2013 Tinkhundla elections'. Institute for Security Studies.

Murdock, G.P. (1965). Culture and Society. University of Pittsburgh Press.

News24. (2018). 'Surprise and concern as king changes Swaziland's name'. Available from: https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/surprise-and-concern-as-king-changes-swazilands-name-20180420

Organisation for African Unity. (2003). 'Rwanda the Preventable Genocide'. Special Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events. OAU, Addis Ababa.

Transparency International. (2018). 'Corruption Perceptions Index 2018'. Transparency International, London

Tutu, D. (2000). No Future Without Forgiveness: A Personal Overview of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Rider.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2010). 'Rwanda's development-driven trade policy network'. UNCTAD, Geneva.

World Bank. (2016). 'Swaziland Overview'. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/swaziland/overview

World Bank (2019). 'Botswana Overview'. World Bank, New York.