

THE ANC, THE FORM OF DEMOCRACY & THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE

Some Propositions for Consideration

What is most readily apparent is the yawning gap between the left rhetoric of the ANC and the reality of a movement increasingly disconnected from its mass base.

By Anver Saloojee

In the past few years the democratic deficit has increased in countries around the world and the electorate in many countries are turning away from the dominant established political parties and are looking to alternative avenues to express their political discontent. South Africa has not been immune to this trend. The democratic deficit in South Africa has been made worse by the inability of the dominant political party, the ANC, to deal

with issues of corruption, nepotism, tenderpreneurship, state and party capture, malaise and dysfunction. Thus, democracy in post-apartheid South Africa, while not under threat, is facing serious and severe stresses and strains. These deep rips at the very fabric of South African democracy began in December 2007 with the triumphalism of the anti-Mbeki forces at the ANC Polokwane conference and the subsequent forced removal

of President Mbeki as President of the Republic of South Africa.

The threats to democracy in South Africa can now be seen at the level of the economy, society, state-party relations, state-society relations, party-constituency relations, disregard for the Constitution of the country, the deterioration of the gravitas of Parliament, the relative capture of party and state by private interests and an ANC that is increasingly losing its

moral high ground and its credibility among all sectors and strata of South Africans.

This is tantamount to an economic crisis, a social crisis, a crisis of legitimacy, authority, morality and hegemony which is amply demonstrated in the increase in popular protests around the country, the withdrawal of the consent of large portions of the black urban voters – including the middle strata – and of course the results of the 2016 local government elections.

These crises can be directly traced first to the 2008 great economic crisis of hyper neo-liberal globalisation that wreaked havoc on the domestic economy; and second to the failures of the post-Polokwane ANC as the governing party, whose leftist rhetoric is incredibly far removed from the reality of the ANC as a party bereft of progressive leadership capable of challenging political and bureaucratic elites who use both the party and state resources for private gain.

In the current conjuncture, space has been opened to engage in a genuine dialogue about what, at a minimum, needs to be done in at least the following three domains:

- Rethink the nature of democracy and formal political representation in South Africa and reform electoral politics in the three spheres of governance;
- Reclaim, reframe and reinvigorate the ANC as a progressive political force in South Africa, the continent and the world;
- Rethink the uncritical commitment to the role of the developmental state.

In the last ten years, there have been significant shifts in the global and national socio-political and economic landscape. Hyper neoliberal globalisation, and contextual hyper neoliberal globalisation (the national manifestations of neoliberal globalisation) have had profound implications for people and their quality of life. In short, the current conjuncture is marked by many factors including but not limited to (i) the political after effects of the 2007-12 global financial crisis including the rise of both progressive and regressive forms of populism; (ii) the socio-political and

military crisis in the Middle East which has led to the displacement of millions of people to the surrounding regions and to Europe; (iii) growing inequality globally, regionally and nationally; (iv) the increased concentration of wealth in the hands of a few; (v) the rise of authoritarian populism in various parts of Europe; (vi) electoral victories for right wing populist parties; (vii) the political and electoral expressions of conservatism and xenophobia – Brexit, the victory of Donald Trump; Le Pen etc.; (viii) the emergence of regressive forms of both political and economic nationalism and the growing calls for protectionism; (ix) the emergence of the counter hegemonic bloc of a

“Common and everyday are internecine warfare within the ANC and between the ANC and members of the Tripartite Alliance; an ANC unwilling or unable to hold accountable its senior leadership and others who have brought the movement into disrepute.”

different kind (the protests against the 1%; Black Lives Matter; protests by Indigenous communities; the anti-G20 protests; the resurgence of political environmentalism; the anti-Trump protests).

There are many profound changes taking place in the world today – changes in trade, technology, communications, migration flows, globalised patterns of production and consumption, a global division of labour, globalised movements of capital flows, and changes within countries of the global South as well as the global North. Many of these changes are linked to the contemporary phase of globalisation.

Hyper neoliberal globalisation, however, has generated successive crises since the 1980s and in 2008 it generated a fiscal crisis that began in the heart of the global North and rapidly spread around the world resulting in the Great Recession. Hyper neoliberal globalisation as marketisation, privatisation and deregulation was unable to resolve the contradictions of the Keynesian welfare state and instead it propelled the world into the deepest recession since the 1930s Great Depression.

Hyper neoliberal globalisation is about intensified worldwide social relations of production and consumption, and increased interconnectedness between nations, societies and even communities where economic and socio-political events in one region of the world can have huge and often unintended devastating effects on people in other parts of the world. For example, the global economic crisis which began in the heart of capitalism, the USA, in 2008 began as a national financial crisis associated with “toxic” financial assets (primarily in the banking sector where subprime lending markets were totally unregulated) and very quickly morphed into a global economic crisis that reached into every corner of the world. For the very first time globalisation in its hyper neoliberal form was equated with the global economic and fiscal crisis.

Almost a decade later, the political effects of the Great Recession are still being felt.

The era of hyper neoliberal globalisation is being undercut by its own record of spotty somewhat weak economic growth and since the crisis we have witnessed a stock market recovery but no global growth recovery. In fact growth in the global north has been anaemic, and the immediate future is for continued “secular stagnation”. This is likely the future for South Africa as well. Secular stagnation, slow growth and the financial instability associated with it have serious socio-political and economic consequences – particularly for the middle classes (around the world) whose standards of living are stagnant or declining and this in turn makes them politically volatile. So,

dealing with and offsetting secular stagnation is vital to socio-political stability.

In his most recent budget speech the South African Minister of Finance argued that:

1. Income growth remains a challenge and there are serious questions related to the middle class – the bottom 20% having benefited from social grants and better access to services while the top 20% had benefited from the rising demand for skills and pay increases while the standards of living of the middle class are being eroded.
2. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few – 95% of the wealth is in the hands of 10% of the population;
3. Unemployment is high – 35% of the labour force was unemployed or has given up hope on finding work.
4. Poverty and unemployment are most prevalent in townships, speaking volumes about the continued racialisation of poverty in South Africa.
5. And economic growth has been very slow – 1% a year in real per capita terms over the past 25 years – below that of the BRICS countries, Turkey, Indonesia and other middle income countries.

It is no surprise therefore that the challenges of poverty, unemployment, underemployment, inequality and wealth concentration, all exacerbated by hyper neoliberal globalisation, have created significant democratic deficits in localised political environments where the electorate are disenchanted with the politics of the dominant parties and are turning to alternative forms of political engagement. Thus we see the rise of populism (both regressive and progressive), the turn to politicians who express the discontent and speak directly to the issues affecting the dispossessed, and we see the rise of protest politics.

In South Africa this has found expression in the 2016 local government elections where many in the traditional support base of the ANC stayed away from voting for the ANC or in some cases voted for opposition parties.

The South African economy, which has lost swaths of its manufacturing

sector and is still heavily dependent on extractive industries, has yet to recover from the effects of the global collapse in commodity prices. There has been rising inflation and interest rates; significantly slowed economic growth; the growth of poverty, unemployment, underemployment, and inequality. Add to this the political effects of the crisis which include a huge growth in popular protests around the country; periodic spikes in xenophobia; a fraying and tearing of the fabric of social cohesion.

Interneecine warfare is common and everyday within the ANC and between the ANC and members of the Tripartite Alliance; an ANC unwilling or unable to hold accountable its senior leadership and others who have brought the movement into disrepute. The post-Polokwane ANC government has become increasingly fractious; there is an open willingness of those in senior positions in government and the bureaucracy to engage in corruption, nepotism; abuse of the resources of the state resources for private gain; to accumulate state resources in private hands; and to openly abrogate elements of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. And there is a widespread belief that the state and the party have been captured by the political and economic elites of South Africa.

The most effective set of policy measures to eliminate poverty have to do with a coherent sustainable employment strategy related to good governance, accountability, working in the public good, creating an enabling investment climate, building investor confidence in the state and the party in power, working with the opposition (particularly where they control a metro or a province). The ANC as the ruling party and the state both have a responsibility to create an environment in which trust and good governance are complemented by a deep and concerted effort to root out and deal with corruption, tenderpreneurship, state and party capture. Much can be accomplished by the setting of annual realistic and achievable goals in all Departments in all three spheres of government.

Rethinking the Party, Electoral Politics and Democracy in South Africa

The Marikana massacre, and the way in which service delivery protests are dealt with point to a potential rupture of state-society relations. This is compounded by other challenges – lack of service delivery to the poorest in many areas, the rise of “tenderpreneurship”, the interpenetration of economic and political elites, corruption including

The Table points to the growth in popular protests in South Africa since 2004:

Community based protests in South Africa 2004-05 to 2012-13			
Year	Peaceful	Unrest	Total
2004/05	7,382	622	8,004
2005/06	9,809	954	10,763
2006/07	8,703	743	9,446
2007/08	6,431	705	7,136
2008/09	6,125	718	6,843
2009/10	7,897	1,008	8,905
2010/11	11,681	973	12,654
2011/12	9,942	1,091	11,033
April 2012 to March 2013	10,517	1,882	12,399
April 2013-March 2014	11,668	1,907	13,575

(Duncan & Royeppen, 2013, and Makinana, 2014)

that of bureaucratic and political elites by big capital.

Add to this the ruling by the Constitutional Court that the President failed in his duty to uphold the Constitution when he refused to abide by an order of the Public Protector to repay a portion of public funds used to upgrade his private residence. The ruling found that the President had “substantial disregard” for the constitutional power of the Public Protector. And the Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng, said “The president is the head of state, his is the calling to the highest office in the land, he is the first citizen of this country....The nation pins its hopes on him to steer the country in the right direction...In failing to comply with the remedial action, the president thus failed to uphold, comply and respect the constitution. The president may have been acting on wrong legal advice, in good faith. But the illegality still stands.” The ruling also found that parliament had failed in its obligations by not holding Zuma to account – a parliament dominated by the ruling party, the ANC.

The protests outside parliament, #fees must fall, and daily public protests across the country all suggest that trust in electoral politics and in political parties including the ANC, and in the institutions of governance and administration is fragile and there is clearly an absence of the strong state-society relations which are essential to building national cohesion. It is important to understand the nature of political protests in South Africa and to not dismiss them as the work of a third force.

In a previous article I have argued these protests are about more than what Professor Alexander calls a “rebellion of the poor” (Alexander, 2010). The protests are not simply a rebellion by the poor, or about service delivery, “... they are important expressions of politics in a democracy, they are about agency, empowerment and active substantive citizenship by those who are disenchanted with formal electoral politics and the limits of accountability in electoral politics. They are fundamentally about the exercise of democratic citizenship and

a clear rejection of passive citizenship.” (Saloojee, 2016)

A 2014 report on service delivery noted that the top five grievances by protestors were about service delivery in general: housing, water and sanitation, political representation and electricity. The researchers (who based their research on over 250 interviews and drew data from four media sources, covering more than 2,000 protests since 2004), found: (i) no evidence of a third force directed at destabilising the government orchestrating service delivery protests; and (ii) little correlation between the upcoming 2014 elections and the

“Trust in electoral politics and in political parties including the ANC, and in the institutions of governance and administration is fragile; and there is clearly an absence of the strong state-society relations which are essential to building national cohesion.”

number of protests (Grant, 2014). The primary reasons for the protests centre on unaccountable and corrupt local government, issues of community safety, lack of affordable housing, sanitation, water supply and electricity. In a world of intersecting inequities, the way in which the state through service delivery seeks to distribute valued goods and services, should raise serious questions not only about efficiency and effectiveness but also about alternate service delivery models.

Protestors in South Africa clearly see protests as an important form of political engagement and as a legitimate alternative to electoral politics, which is viewed as a formal, albeit non substantial form of political

participation that occurs every few years. Protests are an expression of democratic rights in action; they are about agency, empowerment and social transformation. Protestors identify the spaces where they challenge the status quo and the prevailing order. Protests are simultaneously about human agency and constitute a political response to exclusion and marginalisation and the lack of accountability of the elected officials. However, it is exactly at the point when the disadvantaged and marginalised in society demand equality, representation, access and power sharing, that there is a backlash in the form of repression of community protests.

The ANC has now governed South Africa for twenty-three years and the issue of national cohesion in the face of ongoing inequality, poverty and unemployment, challenges to service delivery to improve the socio-economic conditions of the indigent and the poor is still being debated. The protestors have developed a measure of cohesion around agency and their opposition to the current status quo. It is interesting then, to note how the post-apartheid developmental state argues it is the central factor in national cohesion, while there exists an active, engaged citizenry, defining and claiming political spaces for protests and strikes.

In this context, the state and the party would do well to heed the voices of the people and improve their material conditions of life by engaging the state in the monumental task of improving service delivery to those in need in the townships and rural areas of South Africa. All the talk of a democratic developmental state and a National Democratic Revolution will be irrelevant without a renewed Social Compact between the ANC and the people of South Africa.

Reclaiming and reframing the ANC as a progressive political force

What is most readily apparent is the yawning gap between the left rhetoric of the ANC and the reality of a movement increasingly disconnected from its mass base. The ANC is facing crises at multiple levels – crises of

legitimacy, authority and morality, the issues (amongst others) of party and state capture (by capital and fractions of capital), arrogance of power, power and the proximity to capital, the rise of a parasitic/comprador/bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and the social distance of the ANC from its mass base. In addition, the NEC needs to hold the “big 6” and the NWC accountable and not be passive bystanders when the movement is being brought into disrepute.

It is important to distinguish between an ANC that contests elections and ANC that governs as this is about democracy and the separation of powers in the Constitution of South Africa. All political parties (the ANC included) contest the election in order to secure a majority of seats in parliament, secure a mandate from the electorate and govern legitimately. Once in power the ruling party exercises state power through control of government. The exercise of political power in turn, requires being accountable to both the electorate and the party. And the party in power has to adhere to the Constitution. Upon assuming political power the ruling party has to judiciously exercise that power derived from the Constitution in the name of all the citizenry. And in a one party dominant system like South Africa has experienced for the past two decades, the ruling party has to, through the committee structures, hold itself and the executive branch accountable. In short in the case of South Africa the ANC has to be both the governing party and the party that holds the executive accountable.

The 2001 ANC document “Through the Eye of the Needle” identified the twin evils of corruption and factionalism; careerism and opportunism:

48 Because leadership in structures of the ANC affords opportunities to assume positions of authority in government, some individuals then compete for ANC leadership positions in order to get into government. Many such members view positions in government as a source of material riches for themselves. Thus resources, prestige and authority

of government positions become the driving force in competition for leadership positions in the ANC.

49 Government positions also go hand-in-hand with the possibility to issue contracts to commercial companies. Some of these companies identify ANC members that they can promote in ANC structures and into government, so that they can get contracts by hook or by crook. This is done through media networks to discredit other leaders, or even by buying membership cards to set up branches that are ANC only in name.

50 Positions in government also mean the possibility to appoint individuals in all kinds of capacities. As such, some members make promises to friends, that once elected and ensconced in government, they would return the favour. Cliques

“It is important to understand the nature of political protests in South Africa and to not dismiss them as the work of a third force.”

and factions then emerge within the movement, around personal loyalties driven by corrupt intentions. Members become voting fodder to serve individuals' self-interest.

It is time for the ANC to undertake an open, transparent and honest look at itself to determine if the warnings of 2001 have come to pass. It is time for the ANC to reinvent itself. In this reinvention, the ANC needs to take a serious look at itself as a political party. In particular, the ANC needs to:

- Recognise that it is a political party like other political parties where there will be cliques, factions, opportunists, political careerists, rent seekers and those seeking proximity to both political and state power in order to advance their own self-interest.
- Understand that there is a huge gap between its progressive rhetoric and the reality of corruption,

tenderpreneurship, nepotism etc. that is a part of its current reality.

- Undertake an analysis of the contradiction that has emerged as a result of policies pursued over the past two decades. Conscious public policy has resulted in the creation of a black middle class and an emerging black bourgeoisie and both classes/strata are dependent on their proximity to the state and the party. The unresolved contradiction (one that plagues every social democratic society where the social relation of production are fundamentally capitalist relations of production), is to what extent, if any, the ANC is captured by the middle strata and the emerging black bourgeoisie that its policies have promoted? And further have the policies of the ANC, particularly in the last decade, created a parasitic bureaucratic and political elite that will thwart the National Democratic Revolution? These are hard questions to ask and harder questions to answer.
- Realise that as a political party there will be significant contestations for leadership positions in the party – that is a hallmark of all political parties. It is a myth that ANC leaders constrain and restrain themselves waiting for branches to nominate them. The notion that leaders must be nominated and should not declare their candidacy should be completely shed. The ANC is like any other party and people who feel they want to contest positions, including for the positions of President and Deputy President, should be free to do so; and it is healthier for the party if they openly declare their intentions.
- Provide for a lead up period where the leaders (particularly for President and Deputy President) have public debates with each other. Then the members to the party convention can vote for the delegates of choice.
- Require all leaders seeking positions to engage in open debate about the movement and why they are fit to lead the ANC;
- Declare slates as unacceptable and divisive, and take action against those who promote them; and argue instead that individuals

seeking leadership positions should be held to high standards and be judged on their own merits;

- Ensure that factionalism is avoided;
- Declare a formal policy of “zero tolerance of corruption” for both appointed and elected public officials that is enforceable, monitored and implemented. A “lifestyle audit” is only one step in the direction of open transparent accountability.
- Ensure all members and leaders of the ANC are held to the highest standard of morality and those who bring the ANC into disrepute need to be held accountable for their behaviour.
- Address the policy of “deployment” to determine if it leads to optimal deployment of personnel in state and party structures or whether the reality of deployment actually creates a cadre of individuals beholden to the leadership which deploys them.
- Go back to the core principles articulated in the “Eye of the Needle”.
- Be fair and consistent when dealing with violations of the ANC code of conduct. Justice should be meted out regardless of rank or position, and justice must be seen to be done without fear or favour.
- Develop a social compact with the people of South Africa.

At a minimum, this is what is required for the ANC to emerge from under the multiple crises affecting and afflicting the organisation.

Rethink the nature of democracy and formal political representation in South Africa and reform electoral politics in the three spheres of governance

Are the people of South Africa well served by the current form of electoral politics in South Africa? The electorate is both mature and highly sophisticated and should be consulted on whether the current form of constitutional democracy is working. A multiparty, multi constituency committee should be established to start a national dialogue on the following issues:

1. Does the system of proportional representation currently in existence

make Parliamentarians accountable to the people or does it breed subservience to the party leadership that draws up the lists?

2. The system of proportional representation does lead to greater gender representation (because of the “zippered lists”) and it does reflect in parliament greater representation of smaller parties than the “first past the post” system, where parties can have a large proportion of the overall votes but still gain few – or even no – seats. But on the other hand is it inherently unstable as it has a greater tendency to create coalition governments?
3. Is there a better system where constituents can hold individual members of Parliament accountable?

“Protests are simultaneously about human agency and constitute a political response to exclusion and marginalisation and the lack of accountability of the elected officials.”

4. There should be a separate election for the President of the country.
5. The elections for Premiers as well as mayors of the metros should also be separate.

At the same time serious attention should be given to the call by Oscar van Heerden for out-of-the-box thinking (*The Thinker*, Quarter 4, 2016):

For example, the top six officials of the ANC could be elected by the entire membership of the ANC throughout the country before an elective conference; that way the focus of conference would not be on leadership elections but on substantive policy, where members could concentrate on discussing the serious social and economic matters plaguing the country. Another possibility could be that the ANC have a reduced National

Executive Committee, returning to the 40 members directly elected and perhaps they too can be elected by the entire ANC membership. This would go a long way towards ensuring efficiency and cogent discussions at the various conferences. Also, there must be a quota on how many of the NEC members can be in the Executive branch of government because currently, when you want to express a serious point which could be contrary to that of the President of the organisation, you would be reluctant to express it fully without fear or favour because he or she may also be your boss in government. And as much as comrades say that this will not negatively impact on you as an NEC member it does demand maturity and strength of personality in the incumbent.

This is not about the ANC attempting to bolster its vote count ahead of the 2019 national elections after its less than favourable showing in the last local government elections. This is about democracy and the accountability of elected officials and the accountability of political parties to the electorate. It is about the people of South Africa being fully engaged in determining the kind of political system they believe best meets their needs in the third decade of democracy.

Some of the recommendations above would require changes to the Constitution of South Africa. And some would require changes to the Constitutions and by-laws as well as of the culture of all political parties in South Africa. However, as South Africa enters the third decade of democracy these are important issues to consider – particularly in a country where voter distemper is increasing and people are turning to alternate forms of non-formal political participation to express their dissatisfaction.

Rethinking the uncritical commitment to the role of the developmental state

In 2009 the ANC election manifesto promised “the developmental state will play a central and strategic role in the economy. We will ensure a more effective government”. However post-Polokwane South Africa’s

nascent developmental state has failed the people on three counts – reshaping the economy, running an effective corruption free government and improving service delivery. The 2008 global financial collapse notwithstanding, the gains made by the poor and the marginalised in the first 14 years of democracy have slowed in the last 9 years and inequality has actually increased.

The time has come to take a long hard look at the developmental state which is fundamentally a capitalist state. The primary difference between developmental states and liberal and neo-liberal states is the extent to which they concentrate power in a bureaucracy, intervene in the market, seek to regulate/guide the market and the active support they provide to capital as the state pursues its economic growth and development objectives almost to the exclusion of other objectives. Like all capitalist states the developmental state, as a capitalist state, has a degree of autonomy from the dominant class but in the last instance serves the interests of the dominant class.

Saloojee and Pahad have argued elsewhere that the major components of the developmental state include:

1. A small, coherent, capable highly trained bureaucratic elite located in a pilot Ministry that is insulated from outside pressure;
2. Movement, and circulation between the political, bureaucratic and economic elites;
3. Weak civil society;
4. An ideological impetus to overcome late and uneven development;
5. Clear articulation of economic objectives;
6. Political structures that enable the insulated bureaucrats to pursue clearly articulated national development objectives;
7. Political mobilisation of nationalism towards realising the objectives (the use of repression if necessary);
8. Intervention in the market, but not controlling it and using it to promote economic transformation; and
9. The use of state resources

to (i) build up the economic infrastructure of society, and raise the levels of education and training so as to provide the country with a significant competitive advantage; (ii) promote social cohesion (and if necessary as in the case of Korea, use repression to deal with labour and other forms of unrest); (iii) promote macro-economic stability as a precondition for growth; and (iv) use state resources to create competitive advantages for certain target certain industries. This close relationship between state/bureaucratic elites and fractions of capital is initially a source of strength of the developmental state but eventually becomes a source of contradiction in the social formation;

“All the talk of a democratic developmental state and a National Democratic Revolution will be irrelevant without a renewed Social Compact between the ANC and the people of South Africa.”

10. An ability to coexist with a variety of political forms of governance – from authoritarian to democratic.

They identify a number of issues and challenges with respect to the developmental state which need to be recognised – namely:

- The interpenetration of the senior levels of the bureaucracy and high political office and fractions of capital opening up huge opportunities for corruption and grand corruption to occur;
- There is significant movement and circulation between the bureaucratic and economic elites.
- The extent that the politics of development find expression in policy initiatives that privilege certain economic goals, the potential

for increased interpenetration of the bureaucratic and economic elites (along with the political elites) is greatly enhanced and in the process increases the potential for corruption of public officials. This means that the economic elite will look for ways to bind and bond the political and bureaucratic elites through, for example, complex webs of interlocking directorships, hiding shares etc., to secure advantages. This points to one of the contradictions of the developmental state – that the very strength it exhibits (an efficient, goal oriented bureaucracy interacting with the economic elite to advance a developmental agenda) is also one of its most critical weaknesses.

In South Africa the developmental state is essential to the NDR and to protecting democracy. It should be realised that precisely because of its interventionist impulses, the developmental state brings into close proximity bureaucratic and political elites with fractions of capital and at these points of intersection there are opened avenues for corruption and capture of state (and party) by fractions of capital.

The developmental state in South Africa is suffused with its own tensions and internal contradictions – advancing the interests of capital through Black Economic Empowerment; wage inequalities and increasing inequality in general; inter and intra state elite competition; political elite-bureaucratic elite competition and strife; weakening social cohesion especially with increasing labour strife; integration into a global economy that brings with it the challenges of external competition for domestic capital.

Between 1995 and 2008, successive ANC governments repeatedly sought to come to terms with some of the challenges inherent in the developmental state because of the close interface between and among elites: (i) dealing with the close relationship between elected political elites and the economically dominant group including the nascent black bourgeoisie – this relationship can take many forms (hidden shares, shares held by non-elected family members,

loans that are not disclosed, courting access to senior politicians through providing perks and through hiring their family members or through co-opting them onto Boards of companies; (ii) dealing with the revolving door of senior bureaucrats leaving the employment of the state and immediately being employed by the private sector where their access to information and their access to political power make them invaluable; (iii) dealing with political and bureaucratic abuses with respect to insider knowledge of the lucrative area of state tenders, (iv) dealing with senior political party officials whose very position in the party provides them with access to both state official (elected and appointed) and the business elites. These are the same kind of issues that faced all developmental states including Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.

The democratic developmental state in South Africa faces all the contradictions and crises that both bureaucratic and flexible developmental states face because it is a capitalist state operating in a neoliberal global economy that has to mediate class conflict. It has to mediate the conflict between labour and capital, between fractions of capital, between domestic and international capital, between protectionists and proponents of structural adjustment; and the state needs to mediate conflict between different strands of the bureaucratic elite. At another level the state has to guard against the "circulation of elites" that can result in state institutions and state power being used to fetter private interests. Success in dealing with the contradictions generated by internal and external social forces will depend on its degree of multiple "embeddedness" and its insularity from powerful economic interests.

The achievements of the democratic developmental state in South Africa must always be measured by its capacity to promote pro-poor, people-centered, shared, sustainable (employment generating) development and growth in an environment which respects and nurtures democracy and the institutions of democracy and respects the constitution and the rule of

law. At the other end of the spectrum the party has to be vigilant about the proximity of political and bureaucratic elites to private capital which opens spaces for the corruption of party and state officials and for the capture of party and state by fractions of capital.

Conclusion

The fight to eradicate poverty, enhance sustainable employment, and create greater states of equality including gender equality, and to close the gap between the two economies is negatively impacted upon by an unresponsive untransformed ANC.

Weak state structures, poor service delivery, a morally suspect ANC, do not serve the people of South Africa well, nor do they aid in the strengthening of social cohesion in South Africa.

This article has suggested that (i) the ANC needs to be reclaimed and a new social compact with the people of South Africa has to be developed; (ii) a multi-party multi constituency committee needs to be tasked with engaging in a national dialogue about whether the current nature and form of electoral politics and parliamentary democracy in a federated system in South Africa serves the people of South Africa and (iii) the developmental state has to be understood for what it is – a capitalist state that brings elites in close proximity to each other and creates spaces where this confraternity of elites under the watchful eye of the state actually creates opportunities for corruption and capture of both party and state by private interests and fractions of capital.

These three areas are not the only ones that should be up for robust discussion and debate. Rather they should be seen as the way in which to re-engage the citizenry with both the party and the state and in the realisation of the NDP. They are the entry point to a national dialogue on a new social compact.

The people of South Africa deserve nothing less than the active unfettered pursuit of pro-poor ecologically sensitive economic growth and development which requires an accountable democratic developmental state that is carefully aligned, carefully staffed and with a developmental and service

delivery ethos capable of delivering on all elements of the NDP (and this requires a strengthened organisational capacity, enhanced strategic thinking, prioritisation, enhanced delivery and strong accountability mechanisms).

The national dialogue should lead to the emergence of a new social compact where the strategic goal of creating a National Democratic South Africa mobilises all sectors in South African society in an effort to eradicate poverty, create sustainable employment and grow the economy so that all benefit from growth and development. The call for a national dialogue by the Thabo Mbeki foundation and some others needs to be supported. The realisation of this strategic goal has to be a united effort engaging all sectors of South African society. In the lead up to the national dialogues conference in December 2017 the ANC should encourage wider civil society participation in the discussions of its policy documents as well as the strategy and tactics document. If that does not happen the social distance between the ANC and its mass base will increase and the ANC will have lost an important opportunity to engage all sectors of society in a meaningful dialogue about the party, the state, society and national democracy and its institutional character in South Africa. ■

References

- Alexander, P, 'Rebellion of the poor: South Africa's service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis'. *Review of African Political Economy*, 37 (2010).
- ANC, (2001) 'Through the eye of a needle? Choosing the best cadres to lead transformation', <https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/anc/2001/eye-needle.htm>
- Duncan, J., Andrea R., (2013), 'Inside Rustenburg's banned protests'
- Daily Maverick*, 07 Mar 2013 12:45 (South Africa). Available at <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-03-07-inside-rustenburgs-banned-protests/#.U2FM7sf8QYV>.
- Grant, L., (2014), Taking to the streets: Who is protesting and why?, 28 Apr 2014 14:45 *Mail & Guardian* Available at: <http://mg.co.za/data/2014-04-28-taking-to-the-streets-who-is-protesting-and-why>.
- Makinana, A, 'New police minister vows to amend Act to fix SAPS woes', *Mail and Guardian*, July, 22, 2014. Available at: <http://mg.co.za/article/2014-07-22-new-police-minister-vows-to-amend-act-to-fix-saps-woes>
- Saloojee, A. (2016), "Social Protests, Citizenship & the State in South Africa." In (Eds.), Kepe Thembela, Melissa Levin, and Bettina Von Lieres, *Domains of Freedom: Justice, Citizenship and Social Change in South Africa*, University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town.
- Saloojee, A, and Pahad, E.G, (2011) "The Bureaucratic, Flexible, and Democratic Developmental States: Lessons for South Africa" in Plaatjies, Daniel, (ed), *Future Inheritance: building state capacity in democratic South Africa*, Auckland Park, South Africa : Jacana Media, 2011.